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COMMENTS
RELIEF FOR HEALTH-RELATED INJURY IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
"I was trapped in that office and couldn't get out. They destroyed
the relationship with. someone I was in love with and very much
wanted to marry. They just took everything. You lose hope in the
future. You're powerless to do anything."*
I. INTRODUCTION
Akin to the pain of a needle piercing the skin of a finger, these words
evince the powerfully desperate suffering of the speaker. The speaker in this
case is Catherine A. Broderick, a woman who has been tormented by a sexu-
ally harassing and hostile working environment. During a five-year period
beginning in August of 1979, she was subjected to uninvited physical interac-
tion, sexually suggestive remarks, and invasion of privacy by her superiors
while working as an attorney in the Washington Regional Field Office of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).1 This treatment injected stress
and trauma into her life which undermined her "motivation and work per-
formance"2 and pervaded her personal life.3 The trauma ultimately de-
* Walsh, The One-Woman War at the SEC, Wash. Post, June 6, 1988, at Cl, col. 2.
These are the words of Catherine A. Broderick, an employee of the Washington Regional
Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and a sexual harassment plaintiff.
1. Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (D.D.C. 1988). The specific conduct
included instances when one supervisor "untied plaintiff's sweater and kissed her," a co-
worker "made sexually suggestive remarks about plaintiff's dress and figure," and another
supervisor "repeatedly offered her a ride home, and when she finally acceded, he barged into
her apartment, and toured the premises, including her bedroom." Id. at 1273-74. Further-
more, other employees who submitted to advances which were sexual in nature were afforded
preferential treatment while she received "unacceptable" performance evaluations for not be-
ing a "team player." Id. at 1272. Ms. Broderick's superiors labelled her a "festering morale
problem" and her performance appraisals reflected a declining overall rating as well as a de-
clining rating in the category of "Interaction with Supervisors." Id. All the while, other fe-
male employees who submitted to advances were being promoted. For example, Mary Bour,
who had an "on-going sexual relationship" with John Hunter, a branch supervisor, "received
three promotions, a commendation and two cash awards." Id. at 1274.
2. Id. at 1278.
The record is clear that plaintiff and other women working at the [Washington Re-
gional Office] WRO found the sexual conduct and its accompanying manifestations
which WRO managers engaged in over a protracted period of time to be offensive.
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prived her "of promotions and job opportunities" 4 and ransacked her private
affairs.'
In a sex discrimination action against the SEC under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Act),6 one psychiatrist diagnosed Ms. Broderick's con-
dition as analogous to a " 'post-traumatic stress disorder' arising from her
working conditions."'7 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that Ms. Broderick's "mental condition was caused and exac-
erbated by the hostile atmosphere in which she worked" 8 and awarded her
judgment. In a "unique settlement," 9 Ms. Broderick "will receive eight
years of back pay, a promotion, counseling and her choice of two jobs at the
agency."' The unique aspect of this settlement is the commission's agree-
ment "to pay for up to 208 psychiatric counseling sessions over two years for
Broderick and to pay for job counseling if she decides to leave the SEC."'1
Traditional Title VII remedies do not directly address the health-related in-
jury of the victim. 2
This settlement more accurately reflects the underlying objectives of Title
VII. These values are "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
The record also establishes that plaintiff and other women were for obvious reasons
reluctant to voice their displeasure and, when they did, they were treated with a
hostile response by WRO's management team.
Id.
3. Wash. Post, June 6, 1988, at C8, col. 3.
4. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1278. By contrast, office worker Alice McDonald who
allegedly had an affair with Herbert Brooks, Regional Trial Counsel, made rapid progress.
"During a twelve-month period, she received two grade promotions, a $300 cash award and a
perfect score in each element of her performance appraisal in 1984." Id. at 1275.
5. She still seeks professional therapy in an attempt "to work through the anger." Wash.
Post, supra note 3, at C9, col. 1.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
7. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1273. The court declined to accept the expert's testimony
that plaintiff suffered "post-traumatic stress disorder," stating that "[h]is analogy relating the
Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, flood and the Beverly Hills night club fire to plaintiff's reaction
to a sexually hostile work environment is not convincing." Id. at 1273 n.3. On the other hand,
an expert witness for the defense "diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from a paranoid personality
disorder," which was defined as a " 'selective way that people fall into to deal with stress,
insecurity, discomfort with themselves.'" Id. at 1273.
8. Id. at 1280.
9. Walsh, SEC Agrees to Outside Review in Sexual Harassment Case, Wash. Post, June
17, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
10. Id. Estimates of total back pay range from $35,000 to $50,000 for the entire eight year
period. Id. at A16, col. 1.
11. Id. at A16, col. 1. The agreement was signed by the judge that tried her case, U.S.
District Judge John H. Pratt.
12. Traditional Title VII remedies address economic injury. The statute itself allows for
"reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1982).
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barriers to employment"' 3 and the achievement of "equality of employment
opportunities."1 4 The objectives require courts to "focus on fairness to indi-
viduals rather than fairness to classes" 15 and award equitable relief as they
"deem[ ] appropriate." 16 In focusing on fairness to Ms. Broderick, it is ap-
propriate to require payment for psychiatric counseling in order to ensure
the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary mental and emotional
barriers to her employment.
Ms. Broderick's remedy, however, is an exception. The Act, as imple-
mented, is normally unresponsive to health-related injury. "The federal
courts have consistently limited Title VII to authorize only equitable reme-
dies ... In sexual harassment cases this generally takes the form of individ-
ual relief such as back pay, reinstatement, and attorney's fees and costs. "17
On the other hand, "compensatory damages based on emotional distress,
mental anxiety and emotional disturbances . . . are not recoverable under
Title VII."' 8 In light of this background, Ms. Broderick's settlement raises
the question as to whether Title VII sexual harassment cases should be more
responsive to health-related claims.
This Comment begins with a discussion of the present state of sexual har-
assment law and the relevance of health-related claims. The subsequent sec-
tion addresses the remedies currently available under Title VII and considers
alternative methods to obtain monetary awards for health-related claims.
The Comment then canvasses the problems associated with allowing and
denying recovery of damages in a Title VII claim. The final section proposes
amendments and reinterpretations of the law, and ultimately concludes by
advocating adoption of changes in the law in order to allow sexual harass-
ment plaintiffs to recover money damages for their health-related injury.
II. PRESENT LAW
A. Elements of a Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment Case
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer .. to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
13. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
14. Id. at 429.
15. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
17. Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Law and So-
cial Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M.L. REV. 91, 106 (1987) [hereinafter Interdiscipli-
nary Examination].
18. Guzman Robles v. Cruz, 670 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D.P.R. 1987).
1990]
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ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.""9 This statute indicates a congressional intent "to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women"2° in employment. In-
cluded within this spectrum of disparate treatment is sexual harassment. "A
pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee because of her sex is
a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of one
sex with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment;"21 there-
fore, this pattern of behavior constitutes an unlawful practice.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has promul-
gated guidelines" upon which courts may rely in adjudicating sexual harass-
ment claims.23 These guidelines identify the different types of sexual
harassment that violate Title VII. "[A] violation of Title VII may be predi-
cated on either of two types of sexual harassment: harassment that involves
the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and har-
assment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or of-
fensive working environment."24
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
20. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)
(quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
21. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1988). In relevant part, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidelines are as follows:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII. Unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition or an individual's employ-
ment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment; (b) In deter-
mining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will
look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents oc-
curred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the
facts, on a case by case basis.
Id.
23. These guidelines, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976). See
also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
24. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986). Health-related injury, such
as emotional distress, may result where an employer conditions employment benefits on sexual
favors. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employer abolished female's job
in retaliation for resistance of advances). Although this type, commonly known as "quid pro
quo" sexual harassment, may result in injury, the scope of this Comment is limited to discus-
sion of the latter type, known as "hostile environment," because Ms. Broderick's settlement
ensued from this type of claim. Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 n.8. ("Since
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The EEOC guidelines and the surrounding jurisprudence give guidance in
defining the elements of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim.25
The first of these elements is the fact that "[t]he employee belongs to a pro-
tected group. As in other cases of sexual discrimination, this requires a sim-
ple stipulation that the employee is a man or a woman. ', 26 The second
element is the employees' desire to entertain the sexual advances. "The cor-
rect inquiry is whether [the protected employee] by her conduct indicated
that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual
participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary."2 7 It must be determined
that the "employee did not solicit or incite"2 the advances and that those
advances were regarded as "undesirable or offensive."'29  This question
"turns largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact."" °
The third element addresses the extent to which the advances affected the
employment environment. "For sexual harassment to state a claim under
Title VII, it must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
there is no credible evidence that plaintiff herself was offered economic benefits in return for
sexual favors, this type of conduct is not the subject of plaintiff's basic complaint in the instant
case, except to the extent that it created and contributed to a pervasive atmosphere of sexual
hostility in the work environment.").
25. Elements of a tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress are separate and
identifiable from those elements of a Title VII claim. The elements of the tort claim are gener-
ally described as follows: (1) Outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) The defendant's inten-
tion of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) The
plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) Actual and proximate causa-
tion of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. See Eckenrode v. Life of
America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (Wife suffered emotional distress as a result of the
insurer's refusal to make payments on an insurance policy). The principal difference between
the elements of the tort claim and those of a Title VII claim is that the tort must be a result of
outrageous conduct while under Title VII the conduct must merely be unwelcome. Moreover,
the "plaintiff in the damages phase of an employment discrimination suit need not make out
the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in order to recover com-
pensation for mental anguish. All a plaintiff need do is present evidence from which a jury
could determine that the plaintiff has suffered mental anguish." Walters v. City of Atlanta,
803 F.2d 1135, 1146 n.8 (11th Cir. 1986). See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).
26. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (1 1th Cir. 1982). In most cases, the
victim will be a female, and therefore this Comment concentrates on those cases. This, how-
ever, does not discount the fact that men can be and are victims of sexual harassment in the
workplace. See, e.g., Edwards v. Dep't of Correction, 615 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (Sex
discrimination action brought by a man who was not appointed shift commander at women's
prison).
27. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. ("The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the
alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.").
28. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
29. Id.
30. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. See also Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th
Cir. 1986) ("Whether the conduct is unwelcome is a fact question.").
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employment and create an abusive working environment.", 31 In order to sat-
isfy the standard for pervasiveness, the advances must be "sufficiently severe
and persistent to affect seriously ' 32 the work environment.33 The fourth
element is the appropriate standard of review in a sexual harassment case.
The guidelines suggest that the courts "look at the record as a whole and at
the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances
and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.",34  An excellent
example of this occurred in Broderick where it was held that on the record as
a whole, the preferential treatment afforded to those who submitted to sexual
advances created a hostile environment for those who did not.35
The final element is that of employer liability. Using the statutory con-
struction of Title VII, which defines employer to include "any agent of such
a person,"'36 the suggestion has been made that Congress wanted "to place
some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII
are to be held responsible.", 37 Under the limits of agency principles "[i]f the
employer knew of the sexual harassment, regardless of the identity of the
perpetrator, and did not take remedial action, the employer is liable.",
31
Hostile environment claims were given legal credence in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson,39 in which the United States Supreme Court found sexual
harassment to exist in the branch office of a savings institution.' The Court
31. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
32. Id.
33. In Henson, the court held that where a police department dispatcher's boss used vul-
gar language and repeated requests for sexual relations the standard of pervasiveness was satis-
fied. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (standard satisfied where sexually
stereotyped insults created an emotionally charged atmosphere and caused anxiety in a munic-
ipal employee).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1988).
35. Broderick is a natural expansion of the standard of review because the totality of the
circumstances standard of review is now deemed to include preferential treatment of others
and how that affects the plaintiff. Presumably, "others" means employees in the work
environment.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Under this statute, "such a person" includes "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each work-
ing day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."
37. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (the Supreme Court suggested
that agency principles should be used to determine employer liability).
38. Note, Employer Liability For Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency Under Title VII, 37
CATH. U.L. REV. 245, 247 (1987). Employer liability goes to the topic of whom the plaintiff
can recover against, whereas this Comment concentrates on what can be recovered. The two
are intertwined, however, because if employers are not "automatically liable" then the goal of
recovering damages under Title VII will be more difficult to obtain. To the extent that recov-
ery of damages cannot be attained, the goals of Title VII suffer.
39. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
40. The employee's superior "fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into
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held that "Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."4 1
B. Health Related Claims
Commensurate "[w]ith the enactment of Title VII, [where] Congress in-
tended to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms,"4 2 the legisla-
tion has been deemed to include protection of the health of employees. In
Rogers v. EEOC,4" an Hispanic complainant established "a Title VII viola-
tion by demonstrating that her employer created an offensive work environ-
ment for employees by giving discriminatory service to its Hispanic
clientele."" The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held" 'that employ-
ees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to pro-
tection from employer abuse."4 5
The ability to invoke the Act for the protection of the victim's health is
based upon Title VII language. The statute declares that it is illegal to dis-
criminate with respect to "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment.",4 6 A state of mental or emotional well-being is necessarily a term or
condition of employment within the meaning of the Act.4 7 The EEOC
guidelines, particularly the element which addresses the pervasiveness of
harassment, set the appropriate standard of review for health-related inju-
ries. The sexual harassment must be "sufficiently severe and persistent to
affect the psychological well being of the employee"4 in order to satisfy this
element.
Since the Act is regarded as protective of psychological interests and the
EEOC guidelines address the standard of protection of employee health, the
health-related consequences of sexual harassment may be properly ad-
dressed. These consequences are normally couched in terms of emotional or
psychological injury.4 9 They include, but are not limited to, depression, "an-
the women's restroom [sic] when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forci-
bly raped her on several occasions." Id. at 60.
41. Id. at 65.
42. Interdisciplinary Examination, supra note 17, at 101.
43. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
44. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 61 (1986).
45. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. ("One can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability
of minority group workers, ... Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious
practices.").
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982).
47. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (" 'conditions of employ-
ment' include the psychological and emotional work environment.").
48. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
49. Although the injuries cognizant under a Title VII claim may be mental or emotional,
1990]
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ger, fright,... defeat, diminished ambition, decreased job satisfaction, [and]
impairment of job performance .... ,5o Just as courts consider these effects
to invoke the protection of the Act, they should consider these effects to
address remedies available in a health-related sexual harassment claim under
Title VII.
III. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER TITLE VII
The language of Title VII grants the ability to "order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, rein-
statement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay... or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."51 This language has con-
sistently been construed to include only equitable relief.52 "Since damages
are not equitable relief, most courts have held that damages are not available
to redress violations of Title VII.' ' 53 This, however, appears to contravene
the original value behind the statute, that being "when a party's deliberate
conduct is so extreme that it intentionally interferes with another's ability to
practice a profession or earn a livelihood, the wrongdoer must be punished
and deterred."' 54 The present interpretation of the Act, however, suggests
that an award of damages will not better deter sexual harassment in the
workplace.
Some courts have disregarded this contention as erroneous and have at-
the claim does not necessarily translate into a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The tort claim can be distinguished from a Title VII claim because the tort claim
requires outrageous conduct while the Title VII claim merely requires unwelcome conduct.
See supra note 25 for elements of Title VII and tort claims.
50. Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 151, 152 n.8 (1979) [hereinafter Legal Remedies]. See also U.S. Public Health Service,
Report of the Public Health Service Task Force on Women's Health Issues, 100 Public Health
Reports 73, 87 (1985) ("[S]exual harassment on the job can hinder work performance, increase
stress, and lower women's morale.").
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
52. See Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("We follow the great majority of
the federal courts in construing 'equitable relief' to preclude any award of damages for emo-
tional harm resulting from a Title VII violation.").
53. Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omit-
ted). Aside from a strict construction of the statute, "the legislative history indicates that the
damages provision of Title VII was modeled on a provision of the National Labor Relations
Act dealing with unfair labor practices which has been interpreted not to permit an award of
compensatory damages." Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989, 992 n.2 (8th Cir.
1984). See also Interdisciplinary Examination, supra note 17.
54. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D.N.J. 1979). See also Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1970) ("What is required by Congress is the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidi-
ously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.").
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tempted to obviate the rule against damages by fashioning new remedies
where they deem appropriate. For example, "attorneys' fees are awarded to
... plaintiffs in Title VII actions as a matter of course."55 Other courts have
endowed victorious plaintiffs with front pay where reinstatement is not pos-
sible.5 6 Without either this award or reinstatement, the plaintiff would be
"uncompensated for the time between the date of judgment and the date the
plaintiff attains the position he or she would have occupied but for the
discrimination.,
5 7
On the whole, the remedies available to redress the health-related injury
and protect the employee are limited. Reinstatement or back pay may indi-
rectly soothe the anger and depression, but they do not directly compensate
the plaintiff for suffering the inflicted injury or resultant expenses in pursuing
counseling. The statute is interpreted to exclude those remedies which
would directly atone for emotional or psychological injury and its effect on
victims' lives. Therefore, "the remedies which would appear best suited to
hostile environment cases ... are not available in Title VII cases. '58 For
this reason, the health-related injuries of the sexual harassment plaintiff go
uncorrected and the perpetrator is not deterred from further harassment
under present legislation.
IV. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF PROTECTING
HEALTH-RELATED INTERESTS
Courts have stated that "Title VII does not preclude all other claims for
relief."59 The reason behind this is "that Title VII fails to capture the per-
55. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 1986).
56. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980); Guz-
man Robles v. Cruz, 670 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D.P.R. 1987); Fadhl v. City and County of San
Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Front pay is the term used to describe dam.
ages paid as compensation for training or relocating to another position. An award of front
pay is made in lieu of reinstatement when the antagonism between employer and employee is
so great that reinstatement is not appropriate.").
57. Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir. 1985) (refusing an
award of the cost of college education in the form of front pay because such cost could not be
considered a post-judgment effect of the defendant's discrimination).
58. Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 642 (N.D. Ohio 1986), appeal dismissed
without opinion, 816 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1987). This Comment contends that the best remedies
are ones which directly atone for the injury because they give incentive to bring suits and to
police the work place, which leads to an eradication of artificial barriers to employment.
59. Otto v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1986) (The supervisor's job-related acts
of harassment produced injuries remediable under Title VII and were not separately actionable
under an alternative constitutional theory). See White v. General Serv. Admin., 652 F.2d 913
(9th Cir. 1981) (In a racial discrimination action the court noted that Title VII does not pre-
clude separate remedies for unconstitutional action other than discrimination). But see Brown
v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) ("[Title VII] provides the exclusive judicial
1990]
180 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 6:171
sonal nature of the injury done to [the] plaintiff as an individual, [and] the
remedies provided by that statute fail to appreciate the relevant dimensions
of the problem."'  The goals of the present statute may be better served by
allowing alternative claims for relief. Those claims might include tort, con-
tract, constitutional, or other federal statutory claims. There are, however,
limitations on the availability and effectiveness of these alternative methods
of recovery.
There are various causes of action in tort which may accompany Title VII
claims. "For example, a victim might allege intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, assault, battery, or invasion of privacy. Thus, in addition to
receiving Title VII remedies, a plaintiff who also files a tort claim may re-
cover compensatory damages, an award for pain and suffering, and/or puni-
tive damages."'" There are, however, limitations concerning jurisdictional
authority. In order for a federal court to entertain a common-law claim and
a Title VII claim, the rigorous challenges of pendent jurisdiction must be
satisfied. 62 These challenges include constitutional, interpretative, and dis-
cretionary restrictions which result in a number of ways that courts can re-
remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment."); Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F.
Supp. 891, 895 (D.D.C. 1982) ("[t]he exclusive remedy for all acts of sexual harassment on the
job must be within Title VII, even though the acts might be cognizable as common-law torts
had they occurred elsewhere."); and Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 340 fn. 10
(D.N.J. 1979) ("under Title VII law, collateral recoveries are not permitted ... [tiherefore,
Kyriazi may not recover under state law the same damages she recovers under Title VII.").
Imposing exclusivity of recovery restricts sexual harassment victims from being compensated
for their injury. This restriction would deter support of Title VII goals as plaintiffs would have
less incentive to bring suits and employers would have less incentive to police the workplace.
60. Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D.D.C. 1982).
61. Morlacci, Sexual Harassment Law and the Impact of Vinson, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.
J. 501, 518 (Winter 1987-88). See supra, note 25, for elements of a tort claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
62. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 1986) ("In order to estab-
lish pendent [ ] jurisdiction a two-prong test must be satisfied. First, the requirements of Arti-
cle III of the Constitution for the exercise of federal judicial power must be fulfilled. Second,
relevant statutory limitations on the exercise of pendent jurisdiction must be examined...
The constitutional prong of the test is satisfied when (1) there is a federal claim which is of
sufficient substance to confer federal jurisdiction and (2) the federal and state claims are de-
rived 'from a common nucleus of operative fact' such that a plaintiff 'would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding . . .' United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The second prong of the test requires 'an examination of the
posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that confers juris-
diction over the federal claim,' in order to determine whether 'Congress in [that statute] has
... expressly or by implication negated the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular
nonfederal claim.' Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)...
Even when the two-part test is satisfied, however, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is still a
matter left to the discretion of the district court, and is not a right belonging to any plaintiff.")
Title VII is not an exclusive federal remedy and an action may be brought in state court.
Concerns over pendent jurisdiction are not present where the action is originally brought in a
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ject exercising jurisdiction over a common-law claim in a Title VII case. For
example, in Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co. 6 3 a female warehouse worker bring-
ing a Title VII sexual harassment action was denied her claim in tort due to
statutory interpretation. The court declared that "Title VII does not pro-
vide a means for an employee to sue non-supervisory co-workers for discrim-
inatory acts" 64 and refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a tort claim
against a co-worker who was the immediate source of the harassment. Also,
the discretionary aspect of the doctrine permits courts to refuse to exercise
jurisdiction over common-law claims whenever contrary to the ideas of "ju-
dicial economy and convenience.",
65
Another limitation on bringing common-law tort claims is the degree to
which those claims are considered separate from the Title VII claim. In
Stewart v. Thomas,66 an EEOC legal clerk complained of verbal and physical
sexual harassment. The district court required the injuries associated with
the sexual harassment to be "distinct and independent ' 67 from the injuries
associated with the intentional tort. This requires plaintiffs to prove that
their common-law claims seeking recovery for health-related injuries are
separate and distinct from their Title VII claims. 68 Juxtaposing this require-
ment against pendent jurisdiction's constitutional requirement of a "com-
mon nucleus of operative fact" 69 creates a narrow gauntlet for sexual
harassment plaintiffs to run in order to gain adequate recovery.
Finally, the fact that tort law varies by jurisdiction creates some limita-
tions on ability to gain favorable remedies. Two plaintiffs in the exact same
situation may gain disparate awards due solely to their geographic location.
This type of outcome fails to support the goal of eradication of arbitrary
barriers to employment as random outcomes still exist. "A Title VII plain-
state court, because state courts may simultaneously entertain common law and Title VII
claims.
63. 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 546.
65. Id. at 548.
66. 538 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1982).
67. Id. at 895. The two injuries included the plaintiff's "right to be free from discrimina-
tory treatment at her jobsite [sic] and her right to be free from bodily or emotional injury
caused by another person."
68. The court in Stewart held:
"[T]o the extent that her emotional injuries were the result of the stressful work
situation created by the defendant, her claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress is dismissed as subsumed within Title VII but to the extent that her emo-
tional injuries were a direct result of the defendant's assaultive behavior she may
maintain her claim."
Id. at 892. Evidently, the court was attempting to avoid awarding remedies twice for the same
injury.
69. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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tiff should not have to depend on the existence of favorable state tort laws in
order to be fully compensated for violation of rights created by the federal
statute."7 To the extent that plaintiffs must rely on favorable state tort law
the goals of Title VII suffer.
Reliance on a theory in contract creates the same problems. 1 Pendent
jurisdiction must also be exercised over this type of common-law claim and
plaintiffs must rely on favorable state law in order to recover. It is possible,
however, for employees to exercise some discretion in this area, as they can
insist on the inclusion of an anti-sexual harassment clause in their employ-
ment contract.72 In this respect, "[w]hen sexual harassment culminates in
the dismissal of a victimized employee, that employee may be able to recover
her resulting economic loss in a suit for breach of contract. ' 73 Health re-
lated claims become significant where the dismissal arose from mental or
emotional stress due to sexual harassment.74 This scenario is limited how-
ever, (1) because not all employees work under contract, (2) those who do
may not have appropriate clauses to protect themselves, and (3) health-re-
lated claims do not necessarily result in economic losses.
Constitutional claims are another alternative method whereby sexual har-
assment plaintiffs may seek damages. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcot-
ics Agents, 7 the Supreme Court held that where an individual's fourth
70. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1465 (1984) [hereinafter Claims].
71. The theory may be either express or implied contract. Under an express theory the
contract will contain a clause which binds the employer to provide a work environment free
from harassing behavior. Under an implied contract, Title VII must be read into the docu-
ment by the court.
72. See, e.g., AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOY-
EES, ON-THE-JOB SEXUAL HARASSMENT: WHAT THE UNION CAN Do 33 (available from
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 1625 L Street, N.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20006) for an example of a specific provision that can be incorporated in the
employment contract:
"The employer and the union agree to cooperate in a policy of equal opportunity for
all employees. Discrimination because of race, color, sex, religion, age or union ac-
tivity is expressly prohibited. Sexual harassment shall be considered discrimination
under this Article. Disciplinary action will be taken against employees and supervi-
sors who engage in any activity prohibited under this Article. The employer agrees
to take corrective action to ensure that such practices are remedied and that such
discrimination does not continue. Reprisal against a grievant or witness for a griev-
ant is prohibited."
Id.
73. Legal Remedies, supra note 50, at 175.
74. Claims in contract would arise where the employee was subjected to sexual harass-
ment and such harassment violated her contract. The harassment will have also caused a
situation where the employee can no longer adequately perform her tasks and is dismissed as a
result thereof.
75. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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amendment rights are violated by federal agents, that individual is "entitled
to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result."76
Where the government regulates employment in a sexually discriminatory
manner, it would seem that a claim for damages may be based upon the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment or the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.77 Under a due process claim, the regulation
must survive strict scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster.7" Simi-
larly, under an equal protection claim, unless the regulation's gender classifi-
cation is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental
interest it would not pass constitutional muster and the sexually harassed
plaintiff may be able to recover damages.79 The values behind Bivens, that
"where federally protected rights have been invaded .... courts will be alert
to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief,"8 seem applica-
ble to Title VII cases.
There are, however, strict limitations on such a claim. The doctrine of
separation of powers has led the Court to conclude "that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers do not extend beyond
the granting of relief expressly authorized by Congress. 8 1 The express au-
thorization of Title VII remedies, therefore, effectively limits the availability
of redress under alternative constitutional claims.8 2 This is evident from the
76. Id. at 397.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Alternatively, the
fifth amendment states: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law .. " This latter alternative, however, is severely limited. See Nolan v.
Cleland, 686 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982) (Federal employee's due process claim arising from
involuntary resignation caused by sex discrimination denied because the predicate for the due
process claim was the basis of the Title VII claim).
78. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (The Federal Courts must examine
carefully the interests advanced by governmental regulation and the extent to which they cur-
tail fundamental individual rights). This argument assumes that a work environment free of
sexual harassment is a fundamental right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." A po-
tentially discriminatory regulation may substantially interfere with this fundamental right. See
also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) ("[R]easonable regulations that do not
significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationships may legitimately be
imposed.").
79. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender classification in an alcohol solicitation
regulation did not support the government objective of enhancing traffic safety). The problem
with these constitutional arguments is that sexual harassment is merely an activity asserted by
individuals and not one that is mandated by regulation.
80. 403 U.S. at 392, quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1945).
81. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983).
82. Title VII, however, gives courts the ability to fashion new and suitable redress in
sexual harassment cases. This is evident in the words "any other equitable relief as the court
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holding in Otto v. Heckler8 3 where, in response to a fourth amendment right-
to-privacy claim, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
said that "[t]o the extent that the alleged defamation damaged Ms. Otto's
employment or advancement opportunities, her Bivens claim is defeated by
the fact that those are precisely the injuries cognizable and remediable under
Title VII.' '8 4 Finally, as the Constitution protects individuals from govern-
ment intrusion and not intrusion by private parties, constitutional claims are
also limited to situations where the government is the defendant in an action,
such as in the Broderick case.
This limitation also applies to the final alternative avenue to seek redress
for health-related injury: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil action for deprivation of
rights.85 This statute was successfully employed by a white male employee
in a racial discrimination action to gain a $150,000 award for mental dis-
tress.8 6 In Walters v. City of Atlanta,8 the court held that there was "ample
evidence demonstrating that the award for mental anguish was not plain
error."88 Presumably, sexual harassment could be similarly remedied, but
there is a caution. "When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congres-
sional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983. " 89 A remedy
under section 1983 may, therefore, be precluded as remedies are specifically
provided for sexual harassment in Title VII legislation.
As previously mentioned, the Title VII remedies have their limitations, as
well. To the extent that alternative methods of recovery are limited, the
health-related injury stemming from sexual harassment goes uncorrected
deems appropriate." The point, however, is that limitations exist on the availability of Bivens
remedies.
83. 781 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1986).
84. Id. at 757.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The language of this statute provides that "Every person
who ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the person injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for re-
dress." There are other such statutes available, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 which provides:
"All persons.., shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
Id. But see Brown v. General Ser. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (plaintiff barred from relief
under section 1981 because the employment discrimination was remediable under Title VII).
86. Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135, 1146 (1lth Cir. 1986).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981).
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and the goals of Title VII are poisoned. An award of damages may be the
only antidote.
V. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
A. Allowing Recovery of Damages
Damage remedies, however, are not without their own limitations. The
first of these problems is that of assessment. In a racial discrimination action
against an airline the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
declared that "it is admittedly difficult to place a value upon the resulting
emotional injury."9 ° This problem could lead to awards which do not com-
pensate the victims adequately as they are either too generous or too minus-
cule. This could easily be mitigated, however, as the courts could look to
analogous claims in other areas of the law, such as the tort claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, for guidance.
The second problem is that of increased litigation due to an incentive to
gain a monetary award. 9' An increase in litigation becomes a problem be-
cause litigation is costly to society. This cost comes in the form of salaries to
government employees and lost productivity in the private sector due to the
absence from work of the litigants and jurors, alike. The development of
increased litigation, however, is a double-edged sword. An increase in litiga-
tion may thwart the sexual harassment menace and may cut the costs associ-
ated with that menace by deterring such conduct in the future.92
Costs associated with employer liability present a problem, as well.
"[R]emedies are particularly costly because they may be borne by the com-
panies themselves, rather than by third parties."93 Large damage awards
against marginally profitable companies could suspend profit distribution,
thereby spreading the cost of sexual harassment throughout society. In a
worst case scenario, damage awards could force financially troubled compa-
nies into bankruptcy and thereby create unemployment for the victims of
sexual harassment. This possibility, however remote, would lead to the
90. Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981).
91. Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1986, at 1, col. 5. This type of reaction was evidenced in the
months following the Meritor decision. Due to the outcome of that case, people gained a
greater expectation that they had the power to rectify their dilemma. State officials reported
that they saw a "rising interest" in filing sexual harassment claims in the aftermath of Meritor.
Id. "The Iowa human-rights commission's docket had 43 harassment cases ... in ... four
months ... compared to 63 new cases in the preceding 12 months." Id. This indicates a two-
fold increase in the rate of litigation.
92. See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE (1988).
93. Machlowitz, Hug by the Boss Could Lead to a Slap From the Judge, Wall St. J., Aug.
25, 1986, at 20, col. 3-4.
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anomalous situation in which the law harms the exact person it is trying to
protect.
Employer liability also raises the specter that insurance will spread the
costs of monetary awards throughout society. This cost is mitigated, how-
ever, as "[a]ll insurance contracts exclude willful acts,"94 of which sexual
harassment is one. This lack of insurance is actually a benefit as costs can-
not spread to society through the increase of premiums.
On the other hand, the market mechanism may act to spread the costs of
employer liability. As the costs of production rise due to liability, the em-
ployer has incentive to raise the prices of his product in order to maintain
profitability. The consumers of his product will then bear the burden of
increased costs due to employer liability. Consumers, however, may will-
ingly bear this burden in the realization that increased costs arise from the
effort to eradicate unfair employment practices.
Employers can also incur costs combatting harassment in the workplace.
Some companies rely on written policies to police their workplace.
Other companies, operating on the theory that written policies do
not necessarily change attitudes, are scheduling seminars and films
to sensitize their employees to harassment issues. Some have even
hired consultants to train supervisors to recognize the nuances of
sexually intimidating behavior and to train women to combat such
behavior through so-called assertive techniques.
95
These combative practices escalate company costs by dominating employees'
time and effort as well as increasing spending. For example, a video training
program developed by the Legal Defense and Education Fund of the Na-
tional Organization for Women has a list price of $495.00.96 These types of
costs, however, are necessary to the ultimate removal of sexual harassment
from the workplace and should be encouraged. 97 Imposing the threat of a
monetary payout would encourage employers to incur the costs of combat-
ting sexual harassment.
A final type of cost which would be incurred by granting damage awards
for health-related injury would be social costs. The effort to reduce liability
costs through training programs may overly sensitize employees to the issue
94. Id. at 20, col. 4.
95. Dullea, Sexual Harassment Guidelines Create Uneasiness in Business, L.A. Daily J.,
Oct. 28, 1980, at 2, col. 3-4 [hereinafter Sexual Harassment].
96. National Organization for Women, Legal Defense and Education Fund, General Pub-
lications List, at 2. (available from NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, 99 Hudson
Street, New York, N.Y. 10013).
97. The costs associated with removal should be encouraged because the costs associated
with sexual harassment far outweigh the costs of removal.. See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTEC-
TION BOARD, supra note 92, at 4-5 and Sexual Harassment, supra note 95, at 2, col. 2.
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of sexual harassment and create a chilling effect upon the social environment
of the workplace. "[S]ome fear the new policies will be seen as an invasion
of privacy or a threat to an innocent office romance. Then, too, there are
worries that the policies might undermine the friendlier, more casual work-
ing atmosphere that has sprung up between the sexes in recent years." 98
Sexual harassment is neither innocent nor friendly, however, and sensitizing
workers to its sincere dangers will create a work force that will be less likely
to sexually harass and more likely to productively work.
Discouraging harassment is but one example of how these problems asso-
ciated with allowing the recovery of damages can be mitigated. Mitigation
furthers the position that damages should be awarded to sexual harassment
plaintiffs alleging health-related injury.
B. Denying Recovery of Damages
The problems associated with prohibiting the recovery of damage awards
for health-related injuries are two-fold. First, not allowing damage awards
defeats the purposes of the Act. The goal of eliminating arbitrary and un-
necessary barriers to employment is sacrificed because victims of sexual har-
assment have little incentive to bring suit when they cannot be adequately
compensated for their injuries.
There is little incentive for a plaintiff to bring a Title VII suit when
the best that she can hope for is an order to her supervisor and to
her employer to treat her with the dignity she deserves and the
costs of bringing her suit. One can expect that a potential claimant
will pause long before enduring the humiliation of making public
the indignities which she has suffered in private, as well as the an-
ticipated claims that she has 'consented', and the attempts to trivi-
alize her concerns, when she is precluded from recovering damages
for her perpetrators' behavior. 99
The undesirability of bringing suit makes it likely that sexual harassment
barriers to employment will remain.
These barriers are also less likely to be broken down because employers
lack incentive to police the workplace. "The threat of liability would give
employers an incentive to educate and police the work force."" Such an
incentive would aid in the effectuation of Title VII goals.
98. Sexual Harrassment, supra note 95, at 2. Examples of employment policies are hiring
consultants to "train women to combat" harassment, circulating written policies on the sub-
ject, showing training videos, developing an effective problem-solving procedure, and encour-
aging employees to report all incidents of sexual harassments and conducting investigations of
complaints. Id. at 2, col. 4.
99. Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
100. Claims, supra note 70, at 1466.
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Stemming directly from the discouragement of Title VII goals is a second
problem, the costs of sexual harassment. These costs are exemplified by the
predicament of the United States government.101 During a two-year period
from 1985 to 1987, a time already marked by an alarmingly high national
debt and deficit spending policies, "sexual harassment cost the Federal Gov-
ernment an estimated $267 million." 10 2 According to a June 1988 survey by
the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, this cost came in the form of job
turnover, sick leave, and decreased individual and group work
productivity.'
0 3
These costs are spread throughout society in the form of insurance. The
survey reports "that in the long run, all employees and the Government bear
some of the costs of treatment in the form of premium increases imposed by
health plans when use increases."" Health plan use is a function of sick
leave which costs the government approximately $26.1 million during the
two-year survey period.'0 5 The health-related injury of mental and emo-
tional distress associated with sexual harassment is the precise cause of sick
leave utilization. 0 6 More likely than not, because of sexual harassment the
private sector incurs the same types of costs. In extrapolating these costs to
private sector activity, the nation's gross national product could be de-
creased by billions of dollars. 107
This multi-billion dollar reduction of gross national product is directly
attributable to the discouragement of Title VII goals. In sheer quantitative
101. The federal government is used as model of convenience due to the fact that a survey
of the problem has been provided. There are however, no restrictions on extrapolating the
results of the government survey to the private sector.
102. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, supra note 92, at 4.
103. Id. at 40. The government survey reports that $36.7 million was lost as a result of job
turnover, $26.1 million was lost as a result of sick leave, $76.3 million was attributable to lost
individual productivity, and $128.2 million was attributable to lost work group productivity.
104. Id. at 41.
105. Id. at 40.
106. Id. at 40-41. ("To measure the dollar cost of sick leave used because of emotional or
physical consequences of sexual harassment, victims were asked how much sick leave, if any,
they used as a result of unwanted sexual attention. Responses show that an average of 13
percent of both male and female victims used sick leave after being harassed. Based on the
responses, and the average salaries of federally employed men and women, the approximate
cost of sick leave used is $26.1 million.").
107. Gross National Product is an indicator of national economic strength and overall
wealth. Public sector activity is but one part of the measurement of gross national product.
This sector, however, has ramifications for the remainder of the economy. For example, the
government survey reports that "employees who said they took such leave after being sexually
harassed lost a total of $9.9 million in salaries." U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
supra note 92, at 42. This loss in salary has a negative effect on the spending power of the
employees and has a negative effect upon the economy as a whole. The remaining part of gross
national product is attributable to private sector activity.
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terms, these costs are potentially greater than those associated with the al-
lowance of a damages award as they multiply throughout the economy in
the form of lower employment and less disposable income resulting there-
from.'08 Furthermore, qualitatively, it is far less repugnant to the con-
science to incur costs in an effort to combat the social disease of sexual
harassment than to incur them by letting the epidemic spread. Allowance of
a damages award in sexual harassment suits would deter these costs as it
would encourage education and policing of the work force and create an
incentive to bring suits to punish offenders of the law. Therefore, an award
of damages should be granted to plaintiffs who have health-related injuries in
sexual harassment suits. These awards would encourage the attainment of
the goals of Title VII.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN THE LAW
Encouragement of the goals of Title VII should be the objective of the law.
At present, however, the goal of eliminating arbitrary and unnecessary barri-
ers to employment is inhibited by the limited availability of adequate reme-
dies. The limitations on alternative avenues of recovery also discourage the
attainment of Title VII goals. On the other hand, an award of damages for
mental and emotional distress would help to effectuate those goals as it
would increase incentive to bring suits and increase employer incentive to
police and educate the work force. The problems associated with allowing
this award are diminished by the costs associated with denying such an
award and by the necessity of effectuating the policy behind Title VII.
Congress should amend Title VII in order to allow courts to grant damage
remedies. "Title VII remedies should be amended to include compensation
for the mental anguish, physical manifestation of stress, and degradation suf-
fered by a sexual harassment victim"' I as well as other similar remedies.110
These types of awards would encourage victims to undertake proper meas-
ures to penalize "egregious conduct""' and would thereby "serve the Con-
gressional goal of deterring all forms of employment discrimination."' 12
Without a direct mandate from Congress, however, the courts are left to
serve the goals of Title VII through reinterpretation of the existing law. In
appropriate deference to the authority of Congress, the avenues of reinter-
pretation are narrow and courts are constrained to create adequate remedies
by statutory language and the doctrine of stare decisis. There are paths to
108. It is admittedly difficult to compare costs without empirical evidence.
109. Interdisciplinary Examination, supra note 17, at 106.
110. Other remedies, for example, would include punitive damages.
111. Claims, supra note 70, at 1459.
112. Interdisciplinary Examination, supra note 17, at 107.
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reform, however, which courts may travel. The intellectual exercise in fash-
ioning adequate relief should include the realization that workers cannot be
made whole" 13 without complete health. An award of damages can be help-
ful in restoring the health of the individual as the lessons of tort law" l4 and
the Walters" 5 case indicate. Equitable remedies should, therefore, be con-
strued to include damage awards for health-related injury.
The courts should also be creative in finding equitable vehicles to award
monetary relief. For example, judges can, define the reinstatement crite-
rion 116 for receiving front pay extremely narrowly. Defining reinstatement
to mean the exact same occupational position as held prior to the sexual
harassment occurrence enables plaintiffs to accept promotions or similar jobs
in different departments of the same company and to be awarded generous
compensation for relocation expenses. Courts can also define the compensa-
tion for training or relocating criterion" 17 of front pay very broadly to
achieve the goal of generous compensation. Training or relocating should be
read to include professional counseling for job-training or psychological in-
jury. Granting remuneration for these types of expenses can indirectly lead
to restoration of mental and emotional health.
Redress for health related injuries can also be aided by the denial of exclu-
sivity for relief under Title VII. Easing the limitations on tort claims would
enable plaintiffs to recover damages under the theory of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Federal courts should not be hesitant to exercise their
discretionary jurisdiction over pendant common-law claims and, to the ex-
tent that it is legally possible, should view the common-law claim as separate
and distinct from the Title VII claim. These steps would create greater op-
portunities for the plaintiff to gain adequate relief for health-related injuries
in Title VII sexual harassment suits.
Attorneys also have a role to fulfill in creating opportunities for recovery.
They must fashion contract language which would place employers in
breach for sexual harassment in the work environment. "' They must en-
113. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); DiSalvo v. Chamber of
Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978).
114. In tort cases, awards for mental and emotional distress are regularly given where the
plaintiff has successfully proven his case. The damages are a vehicle to redress the injury
sustained by the plaintiff.
115. Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (1986) ("The jury awarded Walters
$150,000 for mental distress.").
116. This criterion suggests that front pay is not available where reinstatement is available.
117. This criterion suggests that front pay is available to compensate plaintiff for counsel-
ing or training to another employment position.
118. See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,
supra note 72.
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courage victims of sexual harassment to fight for the respect they naturally
deserve. Finally, lawyers are instrumental in fabricating the arguments
which will enlighten the courts to the deficiencies of Title VII remedies.
The unresponsiveness of Title VII remedies to health-related injuries re-
sults in unobtainable damage awards and creates a disincentive for plaintiffs
to bring suits and for employers to police the workplace. These disincen-
tives, in turn, discourage support of the values behind the Act. Artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment on the basis of sex will
continue to pervade the American labor force so long as the legislation re-
mains unchanged. Attorneys, judges, and Congress must combine to eradi-
cate the ineptitude of Title VII by creating remedies which will
appropriately compensate victims for their injury. The Broderick settlement,
although only a minor footnote in legal history, may be the initial step to-
wards recognition of the personal nature of sexual harassment injuries and
correction of the problems of Title VII. If this is so, it should be the policy
of our society to encourage and expand upon these types of settlements in
order to ensure that the goal of equality in employment is not blinded by sex.
Kevin Thomas Kramer
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